Traditionally, the mayor has an important role as a citizen’s father and as a maintainer of public order. In the context of the so-called ‘undermining’ criminality, the mayor has been increasingly empowered with new legal instruments to combat undermining criminality. Some mayors see themselves as a sheriff. However, in the Dutch Municipal Act, the mayor only has a task of maintaining the public order. How does this task relate to combating undermining criminality? What is the role of the mayor in the combat of undermining criminality? Nowadays, there is no legal basis in the Dutch Municipal Act to equip the mayor with crime-fighting duties. This article proposes to equip the mayor with a legal duty as a crime fighter.

The Financial Action Task Force reported that money launderers may operate in professional money laundering networks. Whether such money laundering networks operate in the Netherlands is unclear. In this article the authors therefore explore whether professional money launderers collaborate in network structures and the business-like manner in which they offer their services. Business-like refers to their involvement in multiple cases, the amount of repeat customers, and excludes family relations. The research is based on Dutch police registrations of 236 professional money launderers. Our results suggest that professional money laundering networks are indeed active in the Netherlands and that money launderers in these networks offer their services in a business-like manner to a varying extent. An important caveat to the current findings is that the criminal cases analyzed predominantly pertain drug-related offenses, leaving the existence and professionalism of money laundering networks in other types of crime, like large-scale fraud, a question open for future research.

The social role of criminals in local communities has so far received relatively little systematic academic attention. This applies more specifically to their involvement in philanthropic activities. This paper describes and analyses the role of dubious sponsors particularly in Dutch amateur football. Although it is difficult to estimate the scope of the problem, results indicate that criminal sponsorship is not incidental. It mainly concerns corporate criminals, persons involved in drug crimes and outlaw motorcycle gangs. The main goal is to enhance their public image. In most cases, their involvement in crimes or regulatory offenses is difficult to assess without a doubt, which complicates preventative measures. Our analysis shows several interacting factors which increase clubs’ vulnerability to criminal infiltration: setting overambitious sportive goals; dependence on volunteers and a lack of formal integrity policies and internal compliance mechanisms; financial problems; and external pressures associated with the club’s role as the ‘pride’ of the city, the village or the neighbourhood.

The focus of this article is on the role that football agents play in the world of professional football. Their role has also been associated with criminal activities such as money laundering, tax evasion, corruption and the exploitation of under-age players. The article pays attention to recent developments in the world of football and the shady business practices in relation to the transfer of football players. Moreover, the article addresses the self-image of football agents and raises the question whether they should take more responsibility themselves in containing fraud and money laundering in the world of football.

This contribution reports about a research in a medium-sized municipality on the possibilities of giving municipalities an instrument to determine at the earliest possible stage which neighborhoods are at (increased) risk of exposure to organized crime and its consequences. We are searching for indicators to measure that exposure to give direction to preventive measures. Our focus is on the erosion of structures and foundations of society as a result of activities of organized crime, eventually resulting in the infringement of the rule of law. It is therefore not about the phenomenon of organized crime itself, but about its effects on society. This requires clarification and measurability of the concept. In this first exploration, we focus on the following five manifestations of the effect of organized crime: The emergence of a subculture: not recognizing government authority; the emergence of takeover of power in the neighborhood; the emergence of vulnerable groups of citizens; the creation of the image: crime pays off; and the emergence of unfair competition.

Multi-national corporations are increasingly facing attention and disapproval by different actors, including authorities, public and (non-) commercial organizations. Digital globalization and especially social media as a low-cost, highly interactive and multidirectional platform shape a unique context for this rising attention. In the literature, much attention has been devoted to top-down approaches and strategies that corporations use to avoid stigmatization and sanctioning of their behaviour. Reactions to corporate harm are, however, seldom researched from a labelling perspective. As a result, corporations are not considered as objects towards whom labelling is targeted but rather as actors who hamper such processes and who, as moral entrepreneurs, influence which behaviour is labelled deviant. Based on theoretical analysis of literature and case studies, this article will discuss how the process of labelling has changed in light of the digitalized, late-modern society and consequently, how the process should be revisited to be applicable for corporate deviance. Given a diversification of moral entrepreneurs and increasingly dependency of labelling and meaning-making on the online sphere, two new forms of labelling are introduced that specifically target institutions; that is bottom-up and horizontal labelling.

The present article examines the financial life of 131 jihadi travellers (JTs), also known as foreign terrorist fighters, from the Netherlands. For the purpose of the research, access was acquired to all their banking transactions in the year preceding their departure: over 60,000 transactions in total. Their income from work or employment, various forms of social assistance, student grants, and other income or expenditure were examined. The data provided a good picture of their financial independence, i.e., the extent to which they were capable of making their own living or needed to claim assistance from the authorities. The analysis shows that it is highly exceptional for Dutch JTs to be financially independent. Only 5 percent have sufficient income from work or employment without making any claims on the government for financial assistance, and are free of mounting debts. The low score can for a large part be explained by the fact that almost half of the JTs are under 23 years of age and/or receive a student grant. Their financial picture largely resembles ordinary students. Older JTs (over 22 years of age, and not having received a student grant for at least one year) underperform, however. Only 9 percent are financially independent. Financial support could perhaps be used to monitor or steer recipients’ role in society.

In this introductory article we will discuss some of the recent developments in corporate crime research in the Netherlands and Belgium since 2008. In doing so, we will answer the following three questions: (1) What are the most important developments in the way research on corporate crime has been carried out? (2) What are key themes in corporate crime research? (3) What are the most important blind spots in research into corporate crime? We will conclude with some avenues for future research on corporate crime and its enforcement.

For quite some years now, crimes of ‘the powerful’ have been studied by criminologists. While researching crimes of ‘the powerful’, researchers aim to maintain and safeguard their integrity and ethics. However, there seems to be a friction between, on the one hand, ethics of the researchers themselves and on the other hand, ethics (policies) of universities. Obviously, not only do they have to justify their actions and decisions to themselves and ‘science’ as a whole, they must justify their research to ethics committees (EC’s) of universities. It could result in complex and difficult situations when researchers suspect that EC’s themselves may be instruments and products of the powerful groups they are studying. In that case, EC’s might undermine ethics and research integrity themselves. What do certain EC- ‘conditions’ look like for research ethics and to which extent do they have to be adjusted or reconsidered when criminologists are researching ‘the powerful’? The key question that will be answered in this contribution is as follows: how can criminologist (re)act ethically responsibly when confronted with (un)ethical committees? To answer this and other relevant questions, after reviewing literature, we reflect on a biographical study of a legal arms trader. We then elaborate on the ‘ethics creep’ (Haggerty, 2004) that seems to haunt social sciences nowadays.

Fermentation production processes for biofuel lead to sustainable energy, but the fermenters can also be used to dispose illegal wastes. Although it’s known that the fermentation business is susceptible for illegal behavior, so far little empirical research is carried out about the modus operandi and criminogenic factors. In this study a crime script analysis (CSA) is conducted to map the criminal process. This analysis shows that the true nature of the illegal waste is concealed by trading without or with falsified (transport) documents and illegal blending. Legal traders operate illegal and form the crucial connection between disposers and end receivers. Criminogenic factors, such as complexity of regulation and inspection, European policy differences and the lack of profitability of the fermenters, make the branch vulnerable for criminal behavior. Intervention options are formulated per phase of the criminal process and aim at prevention or increasing the chance being caught.

In the past decades, organised crime internationalised rapidly as a result of increasing mobility and ‘open’ borders. At the same time developments in information and communication technology have led to modernisation of existing types of crime and the introduction of novel ones. Finally, criminals have benefited from increasingly diversified migration streams. In the Netherlands and Belgium, organised crime appeared on the agenda in the 1990s. For a long time emphasis was on ‘trade crimes’ i.e. trafficking in drugs and humans, as well as human smuggling, followed by the production of synthetic drugs and cannabis. More recently the Low Countries are confronted by more visible manifestations of organised crime, for example rapid growth of outlaw motorcycle gangs. Criminals also try to utilise their capital to invest in businesses and real estate and to influence local politics.

The concept of undermining or subversive crime seems to be linked undistinguishably to organized crime and both terms are sometimes used synonymously. Definitions of the phenomenon are sometimes based on its effects, while others have their focus on its manifestations. Discussion on the underlying causes is lacking. Regularly, activities that actually do not relate to undermining are labeled as such.
This reflection critically examines and evaluates the concept of undermining. The central question is what has to be understood under the concept of undermining and, above all: what not? The phenomenon is further explored, with the aim of stimulating scientific debate and empirical research. The role of the government and other institutions in facilitating undermining is explicitly discussed as well as the possibilities to strengthen their resilience.

Measures to combat international crime include customer identity controls by banks and repressive measures against informal money transfer systems. While there is debate surrounding the latter strategy, customer identity controls are largely taken for granted in the Netherlands. The author argues that these controls can negatively affect migrants. Moreover, exclusion of migrants from regulated banking systems has development implications. Phone-based remittances, that are linked to the regulated banking system, could serve as an alternative for informal transfer systems. Too stringent identity controls in host countries seem to prevent this however. The author recommends that controls focus on the amount being transferred, rather than on the person making the transfer.

Employment and crime are commonly assumed to be negatively correlated. Those employed are less likely to commit crimes, and conversely, those who have a criminal record are less likely to become employed. Criminological research has provided strong empirical and theoretical support for the link between employment and crime, but also suggests that a complex set of mechanisms may be at play. Additionally, studies show that employment can also increase the risk of criminal behaviour. In the introduction of this special issue, three causal relationships in the work-crime nexus will be discussed: employment causing crime, employment preventing crime, and crime blocking future employment.

A part in Dutch penal law defines money laundering as ‘any person who acquires an object, possesses it, hands it over or sells it or makes use of an object, knowing that the object originates – directly or indirectly – from an offense’. Under object is meant any goods and any property rights. With this in mind, the author argues that whoever knows that money (the object) is derived from crime, but spends the money anyway, is committing a money laundering offense. Taking the argument one step further, it is therefore a reasonable hypothesis that a large number of wives or girlfriends of criminals, have been prosecuted for money laundering. That is, if the women knew that the money they spent was obtained through crime. To test the hypothesis, 62 cases dealing with organized crime were selected and analyzed. These cases largely focus on male perpetrators of drug crimes, money laundering, human smuggling and human trafficking. It turns out that the women often knew their male friends or husbands were involved in crime. The women also profited of these crimes because they used their friends’ expensive cars, lived in large mansions and often went shopping for luxury items. Still, hardly anyone was prosecuted for money laundering offenses. Several explanations were found, ranging from pity of officers, an overload of work, absence of direct proof or simply male chauvinist bias. Only if the women were actively involved in other crimes, would they find themselves prosecuted with (among others) money laundering offenses.