In this article, Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs) are understood as being social movement organizations advocating for the legalization of a closed, cooperative and non-profit model for cannabis supply among adult users. Drawing on qualitative data collected in Belgium, this paper analyses how one becomes a leader of a CSC as well as the functional role assumed by those individuals. It further unveils how Belgian CSC leaders’ engagement in those organizations and in the wider cannabis movement is perceived. We identify and discuss the techniques employed by those key activists to manage cannabis-related stigma drawing on a framework developed by Lindblom and Jacobsson’s (2014). While CSCs might contribute to normalizing cannabis use and supply, our analysis suggests that CSC leaders face some degree of stigmatization, shifting between conformist and confrontational techniques to manage the perceived cannabis-related stigma. Building on the case of Belgian CSC leaders, this paper makes a contribution to the understanding of an under-researched movement, and the role of the leaders within it, expanding also the application of Lindblom and Jacobsson’s (2014) framework to a novel area of activism.

In the introductory article of this special issue on ‘moral entrepreneurs’ in the 21st century, we situate different notions of moral entrepreneurship. Particularly foregrounding Howard Becker’s definition, we discuss its origins and use in subsequent research. The question that we’ve put forward in the ‘call for papers’ for this special issue is to what extent the notion is relevant in contemporary research and who is considered as ‘moral entrepreneur’. The research papers discuss ‘entrepreneurial’ practices of university ethic commissions, medical professionals, police officers and the leaders of cannabis social clubs. We conclude that the underlying rationales and discourses of moral entrepreneurs that the authors identify, reflect contemporary neoliberal ideals.

In this article, I am using Becker’s concept of moral entrepreneur to analyse the role of pain specialists in the labelling process, which has led to the normalisation of the use of opioid painkillers in the United States and ultimately to the death over 200.000 Americans. In general, the literature on labelling centres on crusading reformers, and the criminalisation and stigmatisation of transgressive behaviour. Here I will focus on the moral entrepreneurship of medical experts. What was their role in the normalisation process of opioid painkiller use and are there any similarities with the strategies of crusading reformers? My findings, based on qualitative analysis of documents such as newspaper articles and academic publications, show that, with two exceptions, pain specialists use the strategies of moral crusaders. First, in their narratives, pain specialists represented themselves as neutral objective experts without the emotional stance of moral crusaders. The second exception, which is related to the first, is that there was less emphasis in their narrative on creating villains, as they could not blame openly standard medical practice because they needed the support of the established medical world in order to normalise and legalise opioid painkillers.

For quite some years now, crimes of ‘the powerful’ have been studied by criminologists. While researching crimes of ‘the powerful’, researchers aim to maintain and safeguard their integrity and ethics. However, there seems to be a friction between, on the one hand, ethics of the researchers themselves and on the other hand, ethics (policies) of universities. Obviously, not only do they have to justify their actions and decisions to themselves and ‘science’ as a whole, they must justify their research to ethics committees (EC’s) of universities. It could result in complex and difficult situations when researchers suspect that EC’s themselves may be instruments and products of the powerful groups they are studying. In that case, EC’s might undermine ethics and research integrity themselves. What do certain EC- ‘conditions’ look like for research ethics and to which extent do they have to be adjusted or reconsidered when criminologists are researching ‘the powerful’? The key question that will be answered in this contribution is as follows: how can criminologist (re)act ethically responsibly when confronted with (un)ethical committees? To answer this and other relevant questions, after reviewing literature, we reflect on a biographical study of a legal arms trader. We then elaborate on the ‘ethics creep’ (Haggerty, 2004) that seems to haunt social sciences nowadays.

Whether and under which conditions restorative justice can be applied to cases of corporate violence is explored starting from the phenomenon of corporate violence, defined as acts committed by corporations in the course of their regular activities but with harmful consequences for people’s health. Specific characteristics of different types of corporate violence are presented, as well as victims’ needs, experiences and expectations. The applicability of restorative justice, but also the need of its rethinking, is discussed through an analysis of the role of its key actors and the concepts of participation and restoration.

This article explores victimisation by corporate violence on the basis of case studies, interviews and focus groups with victims and professionals carried out in the European project Victims and Corporations. The typical characteristics of victimisation by corporate violence are described, as well as the harmful effects for victims and their social context. The problematic aspects of tackling corporate violence through criminal procedures lead to a first evaluation of the possible contribution of restorative processes to this field on the basis of interviews and a focus group with restorative justice professionals.

The Dutch Regional Fire Services collectively aim at preventing fire, casualties and damage. The main activity is informing citizens about fire risks and the appropriate measures they can take. From both a political and social perspective, it is valuable to know what the return of the Community Fire Safety program is. One way to chart the return of the program is a comparison of the cost of, and society’s willingness-to-pay for, the program. To estimate this willingness-to-pay, this article applies the contingent valuation method to a national representative sample of 806 Dutch citizens. The results show that willingness-to-pay of an average Dutch household is estimated to be between € 25.00 and € 35.67 per year provided the Community Fire Safety program improves the fire safety by 10%. At the national level, this amounts to 200 – 270 million euro annually. This value is seven to ten times more than the approximate costs of the current Community Fire Safety program.

Since the 1970s social integration of the police has been considered as a key element of the Dutch police. This article focusses on the question of the relevance of social integration of the contemporary police. The article is based on interviews with present and former strategic leaders of the Dutch police. This study shows that social integration is still often considered to be a highly important value for the Dutch police, particularly with regard to the growing polarisation in society. However, some of the police chiefs also express their disapproval of the concept of social integration; in their view the concept reminds us of the past. Also, police chiefs are critical of the value of the concept because of its supposed geographical focus. The paper shows that this criticism can be understood as an interpretation of social integration in terms of ‘neighbourhood policing’ and as an operational police strategy.

Following a crisis, questions are often raised about how this crisis could have happened and whether someone is to be blamed for the crisis or its bad management. The blame game can become fierce as actors try to avoid, shift or mitigate blame in order to stay in office. In 2014, a festival took place in Haaksbergen where a monster truck drove into the audience, killing three people and injuring many others. Not enough safety measures had been taken to prevent the tragedy. Many actors were to blame for that, including the local authority which had granted the permit. Other actors blamed for the events were the mayor, the monster truck driver, and the organization organizing the festival. In the end, the mayor of Haaksbergen resigned. Instead of becoming more accommodative in his response as his blame levels increased, the mayor continued to be quite defensive, stating that the permit would be granted again – even with today’s knowledge. As one council member stated it, one cannot defend something which cannot be defended.

This contribution reports on a delimited part of a larger, exploratory study, the main question of which was: How do aldermen perceive threats, what are their behavioral intentions and what is the influence of threats on the process and the outcome of decision-making? This question was answered with the help of Q-methodology, semi-structured interviews and case studies. This article discusses the results of the Q-methodology and the semi-structured interviews. The case studies will be reported separately later on. Through the Q-methodology three patterns in perception were found in dealing with threats: ‘combative and decisive’, ‘vulnerable and thoughtful’ and ‘down-to-earth and accepting’. The interviews show that it usually concerns instrumental threats that are deliberately used to influence decision making, which usually take place in the private sphere and vary from verbal aggression to physical violence. Most threats come from individuals, but some come from groups, in some cases there is a relationship with criminals. In the cases reviewed, the consequences in the private sphere are far-reaching, there are indications for the influence on public functioning (from hardening to great caution). There is almost always a report, a fuss in the media can affect the authority of the official.

In the United States, the term disproportionate minority contact (DMC) is used to refer to the disproportionate number of minority youth who come into contact with the juvenile justice system. Statistics on DMC in the United States put the issue on the political agenda and measures have been taken to reduce the inequality. In the Netherlands, there are some studies on the representation of ethnic minority groups in suspect statistics, but data regarding all ethnic groups at various stages of the juvenile justice chain are lacking. Due to this lack of information, DMC is not mentioned in Dutch research literature and is not a political issue. Therefore, the purpose of this article was to explore whether DMC existed in the Netherlands and whether elements of the US policy could be applied to the Dutch situation. To investigate this, the likelihood (odds ratio (OR)) was calculated for young people with a migration background to be registered and held as a suspect, to participate in an alternative punishment program (Halt) and their likelihood of incarceration. It turned out that the OR for young people with a non-Western migration background to be registered as a suspect was more than three times as high, with an OR of 5 or higher for some ethnic groups. The chances of a Halt-settlement were much lower for young people with a non-Western background. The odds of ending up in a youth prison was over six times higher for youngsters with a non-Western background compared to their Dutch native peers. For young people of Caribbean and Moroccan origin the likelihood was more than ten times higher. These results showed that DMC is present at all examined stages in the Dutch juvenile justice chain. The large overrepresentation of young people with a migration background (especially of Moroccan and Caribbean origin) shows that further research is needed in order to develop programs to reduce DMC. To establish this, it is important to register the ethnic origin of the individuals at all stages of the juvenile justice chain.