Over the years, the use of data and digital technology in neighbourhood watch groups for prevention and detection of crime and citizens initiatives to enhance public safety has increased due to social and technological changes of citizen participation in coproduction of safety and digitization of economy and society. This causes a transition towards a new technology regime, a shift from a ‘closed’ information and communication technology regime owned by governmental organizations towards (inter)national ‘open’ platforms, which in turn challenges the current policy regime. This transition creates new societal expectations and challenges, often with contrasting dynamics. For instance, citizens are becoming the so-called ‘eyes and ears’ for government in prevention and detection of crime in neighbourhoods, while professionals are increasingly expected to coproduce safety with citizens through new forms of prevention and detection. With the rise of data and digital technology such as platforms and applications citizens are increasingly enabled to take the lead and initiate collaboration and organize new forms of prevention and surveillance in their own neighbourhoods.
Both in literature as in public policy practice, neighbourhood prevention and crime detection in general is addressed. However, less attention is spent on the role and impact of data and digital technology. We propose this is an issue because the emerging digital technology regime requires a new conceptual view wherein citizen initiatives are no longer perceived as merely instrumental to government interventions, but are understood as coproducers of public safety in their neighbourhoods, as part of a broader societal shift in which citizens are enabled by digital technology to organize their own data environments. Based on the introduction of digital coproduction, we illustrate four case examples to explain which opportunities for safety professionals and local governments arise to create a policy regime that suits the emerging digital technology regime.

It is often assumed that digital neighbourhood watch groups lead to more emergency calls and more arrests by the police. This article revolves around the question whether or not these groups actually contribute to reducing crime in the Netherlands. It does so by looking at recent studies and the results of researchers’ own ‘realist evaluation’ of the city of Rotterdam’s policy on digital neighbourhood watch. The latter includes a reconstruction of the program theory and ten case studies with different types of groups. The reconstruction of program theory revealed two main routes to crime reduction: 1) more emergency calls and more arrests by the police and 2) more social control. Chat histories have been studied and moderators, participants, non-participants and professionals were interviewed on their perception of active mechanisms and on the efficacy of their group. None of the respondents believed their group led to an increased number of arrests, but interviews and chat histories show that crime can be reduced by means of social control. Social control by neighbours limits the opportunity for crime and disturbs criminal acts. Other studies in the Netherlands support this finding. The article closes by putting digital neighbourhood watch in a citizen’s perspective with suggestions to improve the efficacy of digital neighbourhood watch groups and the notion that for citizens, crime reduction is not the only or principal goal.

This contribution provides an overview of the legal and criminological research into the decision following the determination of a supervisor that the conditions of a freedom-restricting sanction are not met. It is an important decision, on the one hand because it can result in a more severe sanction than was initially imposed, on the other hand because a decision that is perceived as unfair can influence the extent to which suspects and convicts are willing to comply with conditions, and recidivism. Yet little research has been conducted into this decision. The legal safeguards with which it is accompanied are lagging behind those of the original sentencing decision. Undeserved according to penitentiary experts. The scarce empirical research shows that decision-making involves many different layers and that the actors involved have different goals, ranging from deterrence and emphasizing the credibility of the system to the successful completion of the sanction. Even in countries where regulations have been tightened considerably, the discretionary power of direct supervisors, such as employees of the working project or therapists, is still large. This raises the question to what extent the final decision maker (usually a judge) still has sufficient room to make an independent decision.

In the current study it was investigated to what extent the presence or absence of victim compensation influences public judgments about punishment by the general public. Results show that whether or not the victim is awarded compensation, both in the case of physical assault and burglary, did not influence the extent to which the general public agrees with the punishment imposed by the judge. Participants do consider it important that a victim has the opportunity to apply for compensation for non-material damage suffered.

This study describes how penal protection orders contribute to victim perceptions of safety, drawing upon data collected via a victim survey (n=101). Perceived victim safety is explored based on the factors of personal vulnerability, procedural justice, and experiences with compliance and enforcement. Results show that more than half of the victims in this study does not feel safer because of the protection order. The effects of the orders are even weaker for feelings of relaxation and feelings of anger about the situation. An increase in perceptions of control over the situation appears to be the most important predictor of an increase in feelings of safety and a decrease in feelings of anger, but is unrelated to an increase in feelings of relaxation. The effect of procedural justice differs per outcome measure. It is associated positively with increased feelings of safety, but negatively with decreased feelings of anger because of the protection order. The positive association with feelings of safety is partly indirect via personal vulnerability. Findings result in various suggestions for future research.

Using frame analyses, the authors explore how people confirm, question or deny victimization, or refrain from interpretation. A frame consists of a problem definition (acts), the diagnosis of causes (identifying actors), and moral judgments. Results confirm that the interaction between factors defines the interpretation of victimization. Similar acts (for instance the consumption of alcohol) are ascribed different meanings depending on the type of frame. The positioning of actors in a frame determines who or what is perceived responsible for the (moral) judgment.

For co-victims of severe traffic offenses in the Netherlands, peer support is offered. However, no research into the meaning of peer support for this specific group of victims has been conducted. In this study, nineteen narrative interviews with co-victims of traffic offenses were collected. These interviews show that through dialogue and the sharing of experiences, as well as the care and support for each other, peer support offers the possibility to work on the meaning-making of the traffic offense and its aftermath. The article ends with policy implications and steps for follow-up research.

There is no clear answer to the question if corruption makes victims. Currently an (international) discussion is taking place about this matter. On the one hand it can be discussed that corruption in general does not know any direct victims and that corruption can even take place without any damage. On the other hand it is known that corruption can cause tremendous public and financial damage, with society as a whole as the victim of this crime, whether or not in primary gradation. In the underlying article these two perspectives will be discussed and applied on two cases. Special attention will also be paid to the impact and relevance of pointing out the victims.

Undermining has become a buzz-word in Dutch politics and security governance. On national and local level there is great concern about the disappearing lines between the legal and illegal world, which affects the democratic order and rule of law in the Netherlands. Hence, everything possible should be done in order to combat the creeping threat of undermining. However, what is undermining actually? And why has the concept become so popular now? In this contribution, the authors will consider those and other relevant key questions about the rise and effect of the undermining concept to provide more conceptual clarity. By critically reflecting on undermining as a speech act, that is ‘underminization’ (cf. securitization), and based on empirical research, the authors suggest that there are two discourses at work that hinder the effectivity of the concept: one is specifically focused on the drugs industry with its illegal activities and one broadens the concept into unlawful and undesired developments that interfere with societal stability. The authors conclude that the concept of undermining may mobilize at policy level, yet seems to paralyze at operational level.

This contribution reports on a delimited part of a larger, exploratory study, the main question of which was: How do aldermen perceive threats, what are their behavioral intentions and what is the influence of threats on the process and the outcome of decision-making? This question was answered with the help of Q methodology, semi structured interviews and case studies. This article discusses the results of the case studies and semi structured interviews on the impact of threats on decision-making. In two of the investigated cases (N=3) there are indications that the threats affect the decision-making process. The first case involves risk-avoiding behavior. In the second case there is a stronger conviction and hardening of opinions. There are no indications that threats affect the outcome of the decision-making process. The political administrative system that we have in the Netherlands is able to counteract improper influence. This is due to various elements in the system such as the boldness and the results-focused attitude of civil service (case 1) and the mayor and aldermen (case 2 and 3) and the design of the rules and procedures (case 1, 2 and 3).

This contribution reports about a research in a medium-sized municipality on the possibilities of giving municipalities an instrument to determine at the earliest possible stage which neighborhoods are at (increased) risk of exposure to organized crime and its consequences. We are searching for indicators to measure that exposure to give direction to preventive measures. Our focus is on the erosion of structures and foundations of society as a result of activities of organized crime, eventually resulting in the infringement of the rule of law. It is therefore not about the phenomenon of organized crime itself, but about its effects on society. This requires clarification and measurability of the concept. In this first exploration, we focus on the following five manifestations of the effect of organized crime: The emergence of a subculture: not recognizing government authority; the emergence of takeover of power in the neighborhood; the emergence of vulnerable groups of citizens; the creation of the image: crime pays off; and the emergence of unfair competition.